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Abstract 
Efficacy of corporate boards and its determinants has been subject to so many interdisciplinary studies in the scholarship literature. 
The aim of this research paper is to empirically investigate through a cross-country analysis the effects of country-level governance 
on governance at corporate level. For measuring the country-level governance, there were selected the governance indicators 
developed by World Bank based on methodology of Kaufmann (1999a,b), while for the dimensioning the corporate governance it 
was selected the efficacy of corporate boards. For the goal of the paper, a multiple regression analysis was performed, by 
employing the SPSS statistical packaged software, so that, to be able to assess the effects of quality of governance at country-level 
on corporate governance for a large sample of countries. By performing this empirical analysis from both geographical and income 
n various income 
groups. Even so, for countries from Europe and North and Central America, but also for countries classified as high-level incomes 
and members OECD, the findings confirm that there are strong positive correlations between most of the World 
governance clusters and efficacy of corporate boards.  
Keywords: efficacy of corporate boards, country-level governance, cross-country analysis, corporate governance, high income OECD 
 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 9th International Strategic 
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1. Introduction 
The academic literature focusing on the boards of directors has increased rapidly, especially in the last decades, in 
the light of the financial scandals that seriously affected some of the advanced economies. This growing interest for 
the efficacy of corporate boards is well argued, especially if we consider the statement of Francis et al. (2012), 
according to nt internal corporate governance mechanisms 
 (this opinion being 
also shared by other researchers such as Coles et al., 2008; Adams and Ferrera, 2007; Perry and Peyer, 2005; Ferris et 
al., 2003; Baghat et al., 1999; Hermalin  and Weisbach, 1998, 2003; Agrawal and Ferreira, 2009; John and Senbet, 
1997; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Good governance at country-level it is highlighted by scholarship literature as being one of determinants factor for 
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given by the assumption that an economy with a moderate level of bureaucracy, a high level or preoccupation for 
legislative compliance and effective instruments for controlling the corruption is expected to create and maintain a 
business environment that stimulate economic performance. In the same vein, Price et al. (2011) argues that many 
governance studies have truly proved the influence of global governance on performance and transparency, which 
 
 
In this wide context of analysis, our aim is to bring into discussion how and to what extent good governance at 
country-level could significantly influence the key driver of corporate governance, namely, the corporate board and its 
effectiveness. This research objective is also supported by the idea that this topic  efficacy of corporate boards  is 
one of great interest and concern for both scholarships and policy and regulators makers, because of its complexity, 
and therefore the need to approach this subject from various perspectives is obviously. Without claiming to provide 
answers to all questions, another goal of this paper is to set a stage for discussion for investigation of the potential 
linkage between global governance and corporate governance along with its central mechanisms. 
 
This paper intends to provide a contribution to the literature by presenting, discussing and highlighting the potential 
influence that global governance features captured through some relevant indicators might have on efficacy of 
corporate boards, based on data and variables computed within the reports issued by world-wide recognized 
professional organizations such as World Bank and World Economic Forum. The paper proceeds as it follows. Next 
section provides a selection of most relevant findings of the background literature; hence reaching our main research 
question -level governance influence the efficacy of corporate boards as a proxy of corporate 
 Starting from this research question we issued the research hypothesis. After presenting in Section 3 in 
detail the research methodology used, variables and data sources employed for achieving the scientific objective 
proposed, we test our hypothesis and the results of our empirical investigation are presented within Section 4. The 
paper ends with Section 5 summarizing the main conclusions.  
 
2. Literature Review And Hypotheses Development  
2.1. Board performance  a key driver of corporate governance 
The board of directors is one of the central corporate governance mechanisms, while it is perceived as a main 
instrument for shareholders to keep under control the top management (John and Senbet, 1997). There is a large 
amount of research papers, many of them adopting an empirical research, bringing into discussion following issues: 
the effectiveness of corporate boards in achieving its monitoring function; the influence of corporate boards on firms 
performance and value; the composition of boards of directors and its impact on firm performance; the interaction 
between corporate boards and management; the role of corporate boards in firms performance during financial crisis; 
the impact of board characteristics on board efficacy and firm performance.  
 
Many of the studies dedicated to this issue were most dedicated to the empirical analysis of the relationship between 
corporate boards and corporate performance, especially focusing on the connections that might be identified between 
various features of corporate board, managerial ownership and firm performance, while the researchers employed 
different research methods in order to face the endogeneity that arises when corporate board structure and 
characteristics are linked to firm performance (Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2012; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Baghat and 
Bolton, 2008; Guner et al., 2008; Manjon, 2007; Gugler and Weigand, 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Bhagat 
and Black, 2001). 
 
Analyzing the influencing factors on board activity and its effectiveness, Vafeas (1999) and Adams (2005) cited by 
Brick and Chidambaran (2010) state that an important determinant of board activity is firm performance, because poor 
performance may impose a greater pressure on corporate boards. Also, it is highlighted the advising role of the 
corporate boards that should provide effective advices about the ways of increasing the value of investments for the 
firms. According to Raheja (2005), the independence of the directors on the board it is perceived as an important 
influencing factor on board activity. Brick and Chidambaran (2010) argue that prior firm performance, firm 
characteristics and governance characteristics are determinant factors for the board activity, while board activity has a 
positive impact on firm value. Also, prior studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Guner et al., 2008; Perry and 
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Shivdasani, 2005; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999) analyzed the relationship between 
board size, board duality, board shareholdings and board efficacy and firm performance, while Francis et al. (2012) 
extend the conclusions of prior studies, concluding that the impact of efficacy of corporate boards on firm 
performance is more evident during the economic crisis period than before the crisis period. On the other hand, only 
few papers such as Mitton (2002), Johnson et al., (2000) analyzed the impact of country-level legal protection and 
firm-level disclosure quality on efficacy of corporate boards and firm performance.  
 
From our knowledge, the prior research studies focused on analyzing the determining factors on efficacy of 
corporate boards are more concentrated on the influence of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, 
while the influence of mechanisms of country-level governance was too less analyzed. Therefore, one major interest in 
developing such a paper was to provide a new perspective, a more global one, from which the efficacy of corporate 
boards should also be analyzed. 
 
2.2. Conceptual approaches of country-level governance 
In the last decades, the concept of governance has been widely discussed and analyzed within the academic 
literature and not only along with its various influences on development outcomes. The concept of governance has 
known many approaches and definitions during time, but 
(Kardos, 2012).  As Ivan (2008) states  was borrowed from the culture of 
companies that wish to lead to an increased efficiency through improving the systems of principles and practices that 
the company was managed. On other hand, Bundschuh-Rieseneder (2008) defines this concept as being  favorable 
political framework conditions for social, ecological and market oriented development as well the responsible use of 
  
 
Governance is approached as a neutral concept by World Bank in its working paper 
, citing from Random House College Dictionary (1984, p.571), where this concept is defined as 
direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens or inhabitants of communities, societies and 
  It is obviously that this concept is a controversial 
one, being a large amount of papers and reports that have provided many definitions of governance. But according to 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2008), in spite of the diversity of the definitions assigned to this term, still there should be a 
consensus about the essence of good governance, starting from the idea that many of these approaches have a common 
element that governance should express the importance of a capable state operating under the rule of law  
 
In the light of the above prior mentioned research papers in this area, but also considering the purpose of this paper, 
we argue that governance at country-level positively influences the corporate governance captured through the 
efficacy of corporate boards and propose the following research hypothesis:   
 
H0. All six World Bank governance indicators (1.Voice and Accountability; 2. Political Stability and absence of 
violence; 3.Government effectiveness; 4.Regulatory Quality; 5. Rule of Law; 6. Control of Corruption) have a positive 
impact on efficacy of corporate boards. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Research goal 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential linkage that could be identified between quality of governance 
at country-level measured through some relevant indicators and efficacy of corporate boards, following to develop this 
empirical investigation from both geographical and income groups classifications. The empirical analysis was realized 
by employing the SPSS statistical packet program through multiple regression analysis, while information from three 
major datasets has been used, in order to provide empirical evidence that might validate or invalidate the above 
established hypothesis. 
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3.2. Sample and Data Collection 
Considering the arguments presented above, in spite of critics and weaknesses that could be assigned to the World 
, our decision was to used all these six indicators of good governance (Voice 
and Accountability; Political Stability and absence of violence; Government effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of 
Law; and Control of corruption) as they are dimensioned within the World Bank report 
Indicato  for more than 200 world-wide economies, based on information provided by more than 40 data sources 
produced by over 30 various organizations worldwide. 
 
Second dataset used in our survey was given by the ranking computed for the corporate governance of each country 
sampled, captured through the efficacy of corporate boards as it is measured within the report 
 issued by World Economic Forum. First version if this report was issued in 2004 (Sala-i-
Martin and Artadi, 2004) and nowadays this report is appreciated as being one of the most comprehensive evaluation 
reports designed to measure the global competitiveness. The global competitiveness indicator is global one, which 
contains approximately 115 variables and 12 pillars grouped on three sub-indexes. The variable - efficacy of 
corporate boards  used in our study is a component of the 1st pillar Institutions referring to the accountability of the 
private institutions, along with other variables such as strength of auditing and reporting standards or strength of 
investors protection.  
 
Finally, the last dataset used in our survey was given by the Country and Lending Groups
issued in July 2012, where all economies of all countries with population of more than 30,000 citizens are divided on 
income groups, according to the main criterion the gross national income (GNI) per capita, using the World Bank 
Atlas methodology. The main categories of income groups as they are defined by World Bank are: low income 
($1,025 or less), lower middle income ($1,026 - $4,035), upper middle income ($4,036 - $12,475), high income 
($12,476 or more, classified also in non-OECD and OECD members). The classification used in our study was the one 
given by the last version of this report issued on July 1, 2012, 2012 which is available until 1 July 2013.  Starting from 
the availability of the data for the period analyzed (2011 year), the final sample employed in our study consists of 144 
countries, and below Table 1 summarizes all data sources and variables used for designing this study.  
 
Table 1. Variables and data sources employed in this study 
 
Variable Name Type of variable Source Description No. of countries  
1.Voice and 
accountability 
Independent 
variables 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
project 1996-2011 
 
It ranges from 
approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance) 
 
215 
countries 
2.Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
3.Government 
effectiveness 
4.Regulatory quality 
5.Rule of law 
6.Control of corruption 
Efficacy of corporate 
boards 
Dependent 
variable 
 
World Competitiveness 
Report 2012-2013 
It ranges from 
approximately from 1 = 
management has little 
accountability to 
investors and boards to 7 
= investors and boards 
exerts strong supervision 
of management decisions 
 
144 
countries 
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4. Empirical results 
 
Starting from all these datasets mention in the section above, the final sample of countries for achieving the 
scientific objective of this cross-country investigation included 144 countries, for which all necessary data was 
available in all referenced reports. In order to validate or to invalidate the research hypothesis proposed above, a 
multiple regression analysis was conducted from the perspective of both geographical regions and classification of 
world economies on income categories. Thus, the results of multiple regression analysis from the perspective of 
geographical regions are disclosed within Table 2 and 3, when efficacy of corporate boards as a dependent variable is 
regressed, one at a time, on each of the independent variables given by all six governance indicators.  
 
When we examined Table 2 and 3, it can be noticed that relevant differences emerge between African countries 
and the other continents like Europe and North America, when the scoring assigned to the efficacy of corporate boards 
is regressed on each of the six governance indicators, one at a time. From statistical point of view, from all governance 
dimensions considered, only Regulator quality  is globally proved as having a relevant influence on the efficacy of 
corporate boards. This indicator expressed estimates over the influences of the policies or excessive regulation which 
could have an impact on business environment.  
 
Also, governance clusters like   who 
expressed the respect of the citizens and the state for the rules and for the public institutions that govern economic and 
social interaction between them are, also,  proved to be statistically significant for almost all regions, except for 
countries from Africa regions. Considering the major proportion of developing countries in Africa, these results are 
supported by the results of previous studies (Bardhan, 2002; Gani and Duncan, 2007) which conclude that instruments 
and mechanisms for monitoring the performance of the public services and the compliance with rules are much weaker 
for such developing countries. On the other hand, the first two indicators who evaluate the fairness of the process by 
seems to 
contribute at the explaining of the variance of efficacy of corporate boards only for countries from Europe and North 
and Central America.  
 
Table 2. Regression of the efficacy of corporate boards on first three governance indicators  geographical regions 
Continent 
Voice and accountability Political Stability Government effectiveness 
(Constant) Slope R Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square 
Europe 
4,032 0,638 0,407 4,267 0,583 0,363 4,169 0,494 0,501 
(30,859)* (5,262)  (39,715)* (4,526)  (41,797)* (6,016)  
North and 
Central 
America 
4,409 0,501 0,251 4,550 0,581 0,525 4,543 0,389 0,542 
(46,716)* (3,727)  (53,749)* (3,787)  (54,632)* (3,922)  
South 
America 
4,262 0,446 0,199 4,416 0,243 0,181 4,387 0,468 0,537 
(38,017) (2,432)  (30,505) (1,332)  (44,227)* (3,049)  
Africa 
4,476 0,136 0,019 4,507 0,225 0,120 4,598 0,331 0,112 
(43,939) (1,066)  (49,296) (2,155)  (38,385) (2,070)  
Asia 
4,516 0,061 0,004 4,602 0,316 0,360 4,437 0,431 0,451 
(42,824) (0,512)  (62,706)* (4,565)  (69,071)* (5,515)  
Note: Number in parentheses are t-statistics; *statistically significant at 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the datasets presented above 
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Table 3. Regression of the efficacy of corporate boards on last three governance indicators  geographical regions 
Continent 
Regulatory quality Rule of low Control of corruption 
(Constant) Slope R Square (Constant) Slope R Square (Constant) Slope R Square 
Europe 
3,985 0,653 0,518 4,155 0,515 0,555 4,247 0,459 0,608 
(33,172)* (6,216)  (44,550)* (6,701)  (54,747)* (7,476)  
North 
and 
Central 
America 
4,393 0,514 0,587 4,616 0,413 0,697 4,590 0,456 0,742 
(49,983)* (4,298)  (67,563)* (5,468)  (73,400)* (6,113)  
South 
America 
4,387 0,413 0,751 4,476 0,370 0,603 4,367 0,337 0,498 
(60,605)* (4,913)  (44,988)* (3,488)  (42,661)* (2,815)  
Africa 
4,595 0,385 0,154 4,535 0,221 0,060 4,490 0,165 0,033 
(42,830)* (2,487)  (39,059) (1,472)  (41,135) (1,074)  
Asia 
4,450 0,392 0,342 4,517 0,420 0,425 4,553 0,391 0,426 
(63,438)* (4,382)  (69,028)* (5,230)  (68,599)* (5,244)  
Note: Number in parentheses are t-statistics; *statistically significant at 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the datasets presented above 
 
Employing multiple regression analysis and considering the same variables, but from the perspective of income 
groups classification, as it is defined by World Bank, the results are displayed within Table 4 and 5. From statistically 
point of view, the influence of governance indicators on efficacy of corporate boards, when multiple regressions is 
applied from the perspective of income groups classification is felt differently and strong differences emerge between 
 category and the others income categories Upper middle 
income
not so great as for  category. Considering the significant proportion of countries 
from Europe and Central and North America included in the  category, the results obtained could 
be correlated with the ones generated when the multiple regression analysis was performed from the geographical 
perspective.  
 
Table 4. Regression of the efficacy of corporate boards on first three governance indicators  income group classification 
Income 
category 
Voice and accountability Political Stability Government effectiveness 
(Constant) Slope R Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square 
Low 
income 
4,262 -0,076 0,008 4,518 0,263 0,154 4,624 0,391 0,127 
(30,781) (-0,446)  (36,178) (2,090)  (25,097) (1,867)  
Lower 
middle 
income 
4,305 0,053 0,005 4,331 0,085 0,025 4,398 0,236 0,056 
(46,658) (0,386)  (45,619) (0,835)  (37,655) (1,267)  
Upper 
middle 
income 
4,419 0,225 0,127 4,459 0,286 0,205 4,405 0,488 0,284 
(63,196) (2,355)  (65,259)* (3,126)  (69,572)* (3,885)  
High 
income: 
non 
OECD 
4,709 -0,303 0,193 4,593 0,315 0,077 4,636 0,181 0,040 
(29,111) (-1,697)  (18,433) (1,004)  (17,524) (0,706)  
High 
income: 
OECD 
2,877 1,636 0,668 4,469 0,522 0,240 3,391 1,075 0,788 
(10,595)* (7,632)  (26,472)* (3,023)  (22,143)* (10,371)  
Note: Number in parentheses are t-statistics; *statistically significant at 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the datasets presented above 
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Table 5. Regression of the efficacy of corporate boards on last three governance indicators  income group classification 
Income 
category 
Regulatory quality Rule of low Control of corruption 
(Constant) Slope R Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square (Constant) Slope 
R 
Square 
Low 
income 
4,469 0,244 0,059 4,504 0,225 0,048 4,507 0,261 0,064 
(29,551) (1,228)  (23,431) (1,103)  (26,043) (1,276)  
Lower 
middle 
income 
4,354 0,229 0,050 4,399 0,193 0,035 4,316 0,053 0,003 
(45,487) (1,196)  (31,907) (0,988)  (32,717) (0,280)  
Upper 
middle 
income 
4,391 0,339 0,235 4,473 0,405 0,284 4,471 0,336 0,206 
(66,829)* (3,417)  (68,637)* (3,882)  (64,630)* (3,139)  
High 
income: 
non 
OECD 
4,581 0,248 0,054 4,466 0,450 0,146 4,537 0,373 0,193 
(15,659) (0,829)  (16,482) (1,434)  (21,428) (1,695)  
High 
income: 
OECD 
3,329 1,178 0,715 3,367 1,090 0,780 3,988 0,668 0,775 
(17,307)* (8,523)  (21,223)* (10,152)  (38,431)* (10,005)  
 Note: Number in parentheses are t-statistics; *statistically significant at 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the datasets presented above 
5. Conclusions 
 
The empirical cross-country investigation presented above emphasized that most influencing governance 
characteristics on the efficacy of corporate boards are the ones that materialized the respect of the citizens and the state 
for the rules and for the public institutions that govern economic and social interaction between them, but also the 
influences of the policies or excessive regulation which might have an impact on business environment (
). Governan Voice and 
and  were highlighted as being less significant for the efficacy of corporate boards, 
especially for countries from other regions than Europe and North and Central America, and also for countries from 
lower income groups.  
Because the impact of governance indicators on the efficacy of corporate boards is felt differently by high income 
and upper middle income economies compared to low and lower income ones, the final conclusion of this study is that 
our findings could only partial validate the research hypothesis issued above, about the positive influence of 
governance dimensions on efficacy of corporate boards.   
No doubt, a more extensive research is absolutely required to further investigate the impact of governance 
characteristics on efficacy of corporate boards. The outline of a potential solution for the enhancing of the efficacy of 
corporate boards is beyond the scope of this paper, but this research aims to advance some thoughts on a potential way 
forward, especially if we consider the influence of governance indicators on business investments. Considering the 
positive linkage that exist between some of the governance indicators and the efficacy of corporate boards, it is now 
clear more than ever that researches focused on influencing factors on efficacy of corporate boards should consider not 
only internal and external corporate governance mechanisms but also mechanisms of country governance which 
finally expresses the ability of state to govern as most effective as possible, looking for solutions and opportunities for 
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